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A Dialogue with Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin
Shira A. Scheindlin served for twenty-two years as a federal judge in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
During her tenure on the bench, she presided over many civil and
criminal cases, and authored many landmark opinions, including those
addressing electronic discovery and the improper use by the police of
stop-and-frisk practices.
Before becoming a federal judge, Judge Scheindlin served as an
Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, a
Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of New York, and General
Counsel for the New York City Department of Investigation. In 2016,
Judge Scheindlin retired from the bench, and is currently a member of
the litigation practice group of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP and an
arbitrator and mediator with the AAA, the International Center for
Dispute Resolution, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and FedArb.
Judge Scheindlin has also served as an adjunct professor at NYU Law
School, Cardozo Law School, and Brooklyn Law School. She is the
author of many influential publications, including the first casebook on
electronic discovery. She has received numerous professional honors
and awards, has served on several committees of the American Bar
Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and is
the former chair of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section of
the New York State Bar Association.
Based on her vast experience on the bench and in practice, Judge
Scheindlin offered her reflections on the issues discussed in the annual
Institute for Investor Protection symposium in the following dialogue
with Loyola University Chicago School of Law Dean Michael J.
Kaufman:
Q. There has been substantial press coverage about your determination
to have female attorneys take a more active speaking role in the
courtroom. Can you tell us more about your experiences on the bench
and in practice that have led you to form that perspective?
A. I reflected on my experience with gender bias in the legal profession
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in an op-ed in the New York Times titled: “Female Lawyers Can Talk,
Too.”1 In that piece, I wrote:
As a Federal District Court judge in New York, I often encountered
this courtroom scene: A senior partner in a large law firm would be
arguing a motion. I would ask a tough question. He (and it was usually
a man) would turn to the young lawyer seated next to him (often a
woman). After he conferred with her repeatedly, I would ask myself
why she wasn’t doing the arguing, since she knew the case cold.
In the 22 years I spent on the federal bench before stepping down last
year, not much changed when it came to listening to lawyers. The
talking was almost always done by white men. Women often sat at
counsel table, but were usually junior and silent. It was a rare day
when a woman had a lead role—even though women have made up
about half of law school graduates since the early 1990s.2

Throughout my experience in practice and on the bench, I have seen
women subjected to both subtle and overt forms of gender bias and
sexual harassment. As I wrote in the New York Times:
The more things change, the more they stay the same. I have practiced
law in one role or another for more than 40 years. I was only the
second female judge on the Brooklyn federal court when I was
appointed as a Magistrate Judge in 1982. I was the first female
Chairperson of the New York State Bar Association’s Commercial
and Federal Litigation section, which issued the recent report. I am
now engaged in alternative dispute resolution, in which women obtain
only 4 percent of international arbitration cases worth at least $1
billion, according to one survey, and between 15 and 25 percent of all
arbitrations.
Progress for women has been elusive. The barriers to real change have
been more daunting than I expected.3

Q. In order to address gender discrimination in the legal profession, you
helped to prepare a Report by the New York State Bar Association’s
Commercial and Federal Litigation Section.4 Can you please share your
reflections on the conclusions in that Report?

1. Shira A. Scheindlin, Female Lawyers Can Talk, Too, N.Y. TIMES, at A23 (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/female-lawyers-women-judges.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. HON. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., IF NOT NOW WHEN? ACHIEVING EQUALITY FOR
WOMEN ATTORNEYS IN THE COURTROOM AND IN ADR (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Nov. 2017).
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A. The results demonstrate that women have not made nearly enough
progress in the legal profession. The Report found that women were the
lead lawyers for private parties barely 20 percent of the time in New
York State’s federal and state courts at the trial and appellate levels.
Women were twice as likely to appear on behalf of public sector clients.
But the overall number was dismal: 25 percent in commercial and
criminal cases in courtrooms across New York.
Q. Are there any effective solutions to the dramatic gender disparities in
the legal profession?
A. First, judges can suggest that the lawyer who wrote the brief or
prepared the witness should be the one to argue the case. Often it is a
woman. Judges are generally more diverse than the lawyers who appear
before them. They should bear some responsibility to ensure that the
lawyers who speak in court are equally diverse. All judges, regardless of
gender, also should be encouraged to appoint more women as lead
counsel in class actions, and as special masters, referees, receivers, or
mediators. Some judges have insisted that they will not appoint a firm to
a plaintiffs’ management committee unless there is at least one woman
on the team. Other judges like Jack Weinstein have issued orders that if
a junior associate is likely to argue a motion, the court may be more
likely to grant a request for oral argument of that motion. Second,
clients, particularly corporate clients, can demand that their legal teams
be diverse. Clients, after all, select counsel and pay the bills. If they
refuse to hire firms that do not provide a diverse relationship partner
and a diverse team then change will happen! Finally, law firms that hire
large numbers of female lawyers, but who, statistics show, often don’t
pay them as well as the male lawyers, or promote them at the same
rates, must stop paying lip service to diversity and take concrete steps to
change.
Q. In this symposium, we explored the relationship between diversity
and decision-making. Based on your experience, have you seen
evidence of any relationship between the diversity of decisionmakers
and the quality and ethics of their decisions?
A. The presence of women in positions of power in law firms and
corporate boards results in better, more lawful, and more ethical
decisionmaking. Diversity is a tremendous asset. I have seen it as a
great strength in the courtroom. Diverse teams reflect the community,
and cases are argued to judges and jurors who reflect the community.
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And as I have mentioned, legal teams benefit greatly when they
empower female attorneys to take on leadership roles on behalf of their
clients. Firms can commit to guaranteeing that junior female lawyers
participate in the same number of depositions as their male counterparts.
They can ensure that every trial team has at least one woman; that
women are meeting clients at the same rate as men; and that bright,
aggressive women are given leadership positions in the firm as
department heads and managing partners. If they do these things, they
will more effectively serve their clients.
Q. Spanning more than two decades of sitting on the bench of the
Southern District of New York, you have presided over many cases that
captured national attention. Can you tell us about your decision to
declare unconstitutional the New York City Police Department’s stopand-frisk practices?
A. In 2013, I issued an opinion in Floyd v. City of New York,5 holding
that the stop-and-frisk tactics of the New York Police Department
violated the constitutional rights of racial minorities in the city. The
evidence revealed that the City adopted a policy of indirect racial
profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local
crime suspect data.6 This resulted in the disproportionate and racially
discriminatory stopping of African Americans and Hispanics in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both statistical and anecdotal
evidence showed that minorities are indeed treated differently than
whites.7 For example, once a stop was made, blacks and Hispanics were
more likely to be subjected to the use of force than whites, despite the
fact that whites were more likely to be found with weapons or
contraband. As I wrote in my Opinion, the goal of deterring crime is
laudable, but this method of doing so is unconstitutional. The Police
Department employed a “policy of indirect racial profiling” which led
to officers routinely stopping “blacks and Hispanics who would not
have been stopped if they were white.”8 I concluded that this police
practice violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and I ordered the
appointment of a federal monitor to oversee broad reforms, including
5.
6.
7.
8.

959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 561–63.
Id. at 562.
Id.
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the use of body-worn cameras for some patrol officers.9
Q. What has been the impact of the Floyd decision on policing and
violent crime in New York City?
A. While still in use, the number of stops-and-frisks has declined by 98
percent from more than 600,000 a year to about 20,000. That is a
dramatic change. This has had a positive impact on both police work
and community relations. During the pendency of the Floyd case, the
City of New York and the Police Department insisted that the practice
of stop-and-frisk was indispensable to their successful efforts to reduce
violent crime. But in my Opinion I emphasized that this decision was
“not about the effectiveness of stop-and-frisk in deterring or combating
crime.”10 This Court’s mandate was “solely to judge the
constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law
enforcement tool.”11
As I made clear throughout the proceedings, even if the stop-andfrisk practice was effective in reducing crime, that would not be a
defense to its unconstitutionality. But, in any event, the evidence since
Floyd was decided has made clear that ending stop-and-frisk has not
had a negative impact on crime. As research compiled by the Brennan
Center for Justice has shown, there is no correlation between stop-andfrisk and crime reduction. To the contrary, the rate of violent crime in
New York City actually has declined since the practice of stop-and-frisk
was dramatically reduced.12
Q. Your judicial decisions also have had a tremendous impact on the
procedures governing civil litigation. In the case of Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg,13 you authored a series of path-breaking opinions on many
aspects of the process of discovering electronically stored information
(“ESI”). Do you believe that there has been any improvement in the
process of discovering ESI since those decisions were issued?

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 563.
Id. at 556.
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., James Cullen, Ending New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Did Not Increase Crime,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW (April 11, 2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/ending-new-yorks-stop-and-frisk-did-not-increase-crime.
13. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 216 F.R.D. 280
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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A. In those opinions, I addressed a wide range of issues regarding the
process of electronic discovery in civil litigation, including the scope of
a party’s duty to preserve electronic evidence during litigation, the
lawyer’s duty to supervise the client’s preservation and production of
ESI, the burden of absorbing the cost of producing ESI in accessible
form, and the appropriate sanction for the spoliation of electronic
evidence.
Many of the principles that I developed in those opinions have now
been codified into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)14 now directs a federal judge
to conduct a proportionality analysis with respect to discovery requests
to determine whether that request seeks material that is both relevant to
the case and proportional to the needs of the case. That Rule requires
the judge to consider some of the same proportionality factors that I
discussed in Zubulake, including the cost of discovery, the parties’
resources and relative access to information, the importance of
discovery to the issues in the litigation, the amount in controversy, and
whether the burden of discovery outweighs its likely benefit.15
Similarly, the Federal Rules now create a burden-shifting process for
the discovery of ESI that is similar to the process that I ordered in my
Zubulake opinions. Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states that a party need not
provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost.16 On a motion to compel discovery or for a protective
order, however, the party from whom discovery is sought has the
burden of showing that the information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the federal
judge may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause.
Finally, in Zubulake,17 I addressed the proper sanction to be imposed
on a party who fails to comply with a request for discovery of ESI.
Finding that the defendant in that case had willfully deleted relevant
emails despite court orders requiring preservation of such emails, I
granted the plaintiff’s motion to sanction this misconduct by ordering an
adverse inference jury instruction and by ordering the defendant to pay
costs. I also noted that the defendant’s lawyers had failed to meet their
obligation to ensure that all relevant documents were discovered,
retained, and produced. Federal Rule 37(e) now explicitly authorizes
14.
15.
16.
17.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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federal judges to impose similar sanctions for failures to preserve or
produce electronically stored information, including an adverse
inference instruction to the jury that the unproduced information is
unfavorable to the offending party.18
Q. In this symposium, we have grappled with the question of whether,
in an era of relaxed regulation, individuals can be incentivized to
engage in ethical behavior and corporations can be incentivized to
engage in social value creation. Based on your experience as a judge
and a litigator, do you believe that people generally need regulation to
make them engage in ethical and lawful behavior, or are they naturally
disposed to do the right thing?
A. It is hard to generalize about human motivation and human behavior.
We are all products of our upbringing to some extent. But I believe that
most people need to have a clear sense that there will be negative
consequences if they behave unethically or unlawfully. If we want to
discourage wrongful behavior, therefore, we need to maintain rules and
regulations that clearly define and strongly deter and punish that
behavior.

18. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).

